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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Minikon Wreth Johnson, a native and citizen of Liberia, appeals the order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) concluding his state drug conviction was an 
aggravated felony rendering him statutorily ineligible for asylum in the United States.  
Johnson and the government do not dispute the BIA erred in concluding Johnson’s 
conviction to be an aggravated felony.  Instead, the central issue in this appeal is the 
scope of our remand to the BIA.  We must decide whether we should remand to the BIA 
with instructions to reinstate the decision of the immigration judge (“IJ”) granting 
Johnson asylum or for further proceedings on Johnson’s eligibility for asylum.  We will 
vacate and remand with instructions to reinstate the IJ’s decision.1 
I. 
 In 1991, when Johnson was six years old, Liberian rebels under Charles Taylor 
                                              
1 The IJ had jurisdiction over Johnson’s removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.  
The BIA had jurisdiction to review the IJ’s decision under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(g) and 
1229a(a)(3), and under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15.  We have jurisdiction to 
review questions of law raised in a petition for review of a final order of the BIA under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252, as amended by REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 
Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005). 
  
murdered Johnson’s father, a military officer under a prior Liberian government, 
seriously wounded Johnson’s mother, and stabbed Johnson with a bayonet, leaving him 
for dead.  It is undisputed that Johnson’s family was targeted and attacked for their actual 
or imputed political opinion.  Johnson, his mother, and his younger brothers escaped to a 
refugee camp in Ghana.  On or around March 17, 2003, Johnson was admitted into the 
United States as a refugee. 
 On July 21, 2008, Pittsburgh police arrested Johnson for possession of marijuana.  
On August 5, 2009, Johnson pleaded guilty to two counts of possession with intent to 
deliver marijuana in violation of 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30) and was sentenced to 
three years’ probation and a $1 fine.  Based on this conviction, the federal government 
served Johnson with a Notice to Appear on August 31, 2010, charging him as removable 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for an aggravated felony conviction and under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for a controlled substance conviction.  Johnson sought 
adjustment of status as a refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)—with a waiver of 
inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c)—and applied for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 
 The IJ sustained the charge of removability based on Johnson’s controlled 
substance conviction.  But he did not sustain the charge of removability predicated on 
Johnson’s aggravated felony conviction, concluding the record of conviction was 
insufficient to establish that Johnson’s conviction was for an aggravated felony under 
Third Circuit law.  Accordingly, Johnson was not statutorily barred from discretionary 
relief from removal, and the IJ granted him asylum—a form of discretionary relief—
  
under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B) on the basis of “other serious harm” Johnson 
would suffer if removed to Liberia. 
 The government appealed to the BIA, which vacated the IJ’s decision and ordered 
Johnson removed.  The BIA concluded Johnson had been convicted of an aggravated 
felony and that conviction barred him from receiving asylum.  The BIA also denied 
withholding of removal and CAT relief.  Johnson filed a timely petition for review.2 
II. 
We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, subject to the principles of 
agency deference articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 205–06 (3d Cir. 
2011).  The determination of whether a petitioner was convicted of an aggravated felony 
is a legal question subject to de novo review.  Thomas v. Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 134, 141 
(3d Cir. 2010).  We review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence 
standard.  Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007). 
III. 
There is no dispute the BIA erred in concluding Johnson’s conviction was an 
aggravated felony.  The government recognizes “obvious shortcomings” in the BIA’s 
decision and makes no attempt to defend it.  See Respondent’s Br. at 2.  Accordingly, we 
will vacate the BIA’s order. 
“When the Government alleges that a state conviction qualifies as an ‘aggravated 
felony’ under the [Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)], we generally employ a 
                                              
2 We stayed Johnson’s removal sua sponte because it appeared he had a likelihood of 
success on the merits of his petition. 
  
‘categorical approach’ to determine whether the state offense is comparable to an offense 
listed in the INA.”  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (citations 
omitted).  But the categorical approach only applies if “the state statute defining the 
crime of conviction categorically fits within the generic federal definition of a 
corresponding aggravated felony.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  If 
a statute of conviction lists elements in the alternative, some of which fit the federal 
definition and some of which do not, courts apply the modified categorical approach and 
are permitted “to consult a limited class of documents . . . to determine which alternative 
formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.”  Descamps v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013); see also United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185, 188–91 (3d Cir. 
2014) (discussing operation of the categorical and modified categorical approach in light 
of Descamps).  Those documents include “the statutory definition, charging document, 
written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the 
trial judge to which the defendant assented.”  Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 
(2005); see also Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284–85 & n.2.  Furthermore, in the absence of 
facts enabling us to determine the elements of the offense for which the defendant was 
convicted, we assume the defendant’s conduct was the least culpable necessary to sustain 
a conviction under the applicable statute.  Jeune v. Att’y Gen., 476 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 
2007); see also Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684. 
Johnson was convicted of violating 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30), which 
prohibits “the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, 
a controlled substance . . . .”  Because “it is unclear from the face of the statute whether a 
  
conviction under the section automatically qualifies as an aggravated felony,” the statute 
is divisible and the modified categorical approach applies.  Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 
287, 293 n.9 (3d Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 
2014) (“Pennsylvania’s possession with intent to distribute statute, 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§ 780-113(a)(30), is divisible.”); Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 289–90 (3d Cir. 
2008) (finding the bare fact of conviction under 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30) does 
not satisfy the hypothetical federal felony test or illicit trafficking element test for 
determining whether a state conviction constitutes an aggravated felony under federal 
law). 
The BIA applied the modified categorical approach and found that Johnson’s 
sentencing order and criminal information demonstrated he pleaded guilty to violating 35 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30) for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and 
for delivery of marijuana.  The BIA concluded Johnson’s conviction was an aggravated 
felony that, as a conviction for a particularly serious crime under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), barred him from receiving asylum.3 
That conclusion is untenable.  The sentencing order shows Johnson pleaded guilty, 
and the information lists the statutory provisions under which Johnson was charged.  
Neither document—nor any document we are permitted to examine under Shepard—
provides any facts indicating Johnson was convicted of an offense that would be an 
                                              
3 That subsection, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), bars from receipt of asylum an alien who, 
“having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a 
danger to the community of the United States.”  The statute further specifies that “an 
alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall be considered to have been 
convicted of a particularly serious crime.”  Id. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). 
  
aggravated felony under federal law.4  Lacking such facts, the BIA appears to have 
concluded Johnson’s conviction was an aggravated felony based solely on the existence 
of the conviction.  But it is possible to be convicted of violating 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-
113(a)(30) for conduct that would not be a federal felony—for example, distributing a 
small amount of marijuana for no remuneration or transferring marijuana to another 
without consideration.  See Evanson, 550 F.3d at 289; Jeune, 476 F.3d at 204 (“[T]here 
are some offenses within the broad scope of 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30) that are 
not aggravated felonies, and . . . something more than the bare fact of conviction is 
required to reach that threshold.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  
Moreover, in the absence of facts regarding the elements of the offense for which 
Johnson was convicted, we assume his “conduct was only the minimum necessary to 
comport with the statute and record.”  Jeune, 476 F.3d at 204. 
Because we cannot determine whether Johnson’s criminal offense qualifies as an 
aggravated felony and must assume Johnson’s conduct was the bare minimum necessary 
to trigger the statute, the BIA erred in concluding Johnson’s conviction was an 
aggravated felony.  Accordingly, we will vacate the BIA’s order. 
                                              
4 Although the transcript of the plea colloquy indicates Johnson’s counsel stipulated to 
the “factual basis” for the plea, it is unclear from the record what the parties were 
referring to as the “factual basis.”  The government appeared to argue to the BIA that the 
“factual basis” was the criminal complaint.  But that document was superseded by the 
information, which contains no factual background.  See Evanson, 550 F.3d at 293 n.7 
(finding that because the criminal complaint was superseded by a criminal information, 
the criminal complaint was not the relevant charging document or an appropriate source 
under the modified categorical approach).  Accordingly, the transcript of the plea 
colloquy provides no facts enabling us to ascertain the elements of the offense for which 
Johnson was convicted. 
  
IV. 
Recognizing deficiencies in the BIA’s decision, the government asks us to remand 
to the BIA based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
1678 (2013).5  Moncrieffe held that “[s]haring a small amount of marijuana for no 
remuneration, let alone possession with intent to do so, does not fit easily into the 
everyday understanding of trafficking, which ordinarily . . . means some sort of 
commercial dealing.”  Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1693 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  The government contends Moncrieffe changed the applicable law and 
necessitates remand so the BIA can address in the first instance how Moncrieffe affects 
its decision in this case.  We disagree. 
Moncrieffe did not change our existing precedent—it confirmed it.  See, e.g., 
Thomas v. Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 134, 142 (3d Cir. 2010) (requiring an offense to involve 
unlawful trading or dealing of a controlled substance in order to contain a “trafficking 
element”); Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 293–94 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[A] marijuana 
conviction under 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30)—without proof of the amount 
involved or remuneration—is analogous to a federal misdemeanor . . . .”); Garcia, 462 
F.3d at 293 (“In order to qualify as an aggravated felony under the illicit trafficking route, 
a drug conviction must satisfy two requirements: (1) the offense must be a felony under 
the law of the convicting sovereign, and (2) the offense must contain a “‘trafficking 
element.’”).  The analysis of the aggravated felony issue before and after Moncrieffe is 
                                              
5 Prior to briefing and argument, the government filed a motion to remand the case to the 
BIA for reconsideration in light of Moncrieffe.  We denied that motion.  The government 
renews that argument for remand here. 
  
the same. 
Remand in light of a recently decided case is not appropriate if such a case did not 
make “such a change in the law . . . that [the government] should have a second 
opportunity on remand to prove . . . [what] it should have, or could have, proved 
initially.”  EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 925 F.2d 619, 633 (3d Cir. 1991).  Here, 
the BIA confronted the aggravated felony issue and committed legal error.  It was legal 
error under Third Circuit law before Moncrieffe, and it remains error after Moncrieffe.6  
Because the BIA “misconceived the law,” we can decide the aggravated felony issue 
without remand.  See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (“[A]n order may 
not stand if the agency has misconceived the law.”).  Accordingly, we will deny the 
government’s request for a remand based on Moncrieffe. 
V. 
We next evaluate the scope of our remand to the BIA.  The government requests 
we remand to the BIA for a determination of whether Johnson established that he was not 
convicted of a particularly serious crime rendering him ineligible for asylum, arguing the 
BIA never reached this issue.  Johnson contends the government waived this argument 
and advocates remand with instructions to reinstate the IJ’s decision granting him 
asylum.  Although in a typical case we would remand to the BIA for determination of 
                                              
6 There are no special circumstances requiring remand here.  This is not a case in which 
the BIA failed to consider the issue before us.  See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 
(2002) (per curiam).  Nor does the matter require a factual determination and application 
of law to facts that the BIA had not undertaken.  See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 
186 (2006) (per curiam).  And this is not a case in which deficiencies in the BIA’s 
decision make meaningful review impossible.  See Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 
238–39 (3d Cir. 2003). 
  
whether the noncitizen met his burden of showing eligibility for asylum, we agree with 
Johnson that in this case the government waived that argument. 
A. 
The IJ found Johnson removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for his 
controlled substance conviction.  A removable noncitizen who has committed a criminal 
offense, such as Johnson, faces two major impediments to receiving asylum.  Cf. Syblis v. 
Att’y Gen., 763 F.3d 348, 357 (3d Cir. 2014) (discussing this two-step analytical 
approach in the context of discretionary cancellation of removal).  First, the government 
may seek to show the noncitizen was convicted of a particularly serious crime7 barring 
him from receiving asylum.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (rendering a noncitizen 
ineligible from receiving asylum “if the Attorney General determines that . . . (ii) the 
alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of the United States”).  Although the statute does 
not speak to a burden of proof on this issue, the statutory language indicates the 
government bears a burden of production to show the noncitizen was convicted of a 
particularly serious crime.  And the evidence the government produces must be “clear 
                                              
7 The asylum statute uses the phrase “particularly serious crime,” not “aggravated 
felony.”  We have held in the withholding of removal context that “an offense must be an 
aggravated felony in order to be classified as a ‘particularly serious crime.’”  Alaka v. 
Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 105 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).  The BIA has declined to 
follow Alaka—even in cases arising in the Third Circuit—contending we failed to 
expressly hold in Alaka that the language of the withholding statute was unambiguous 
and left no room for agency discretion.  See In re M-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 46, 49–50 (BIA 
2012) (“We conclude that the respondent need not have been convicted of an aggravated 
felony to be subject to the particularly serious crime bars for asylum and withholding of 
removal.”).  But we need not decide whether Alaka applies in the asylum context or 
reevaluate that decision because the issue was neither briefed by the parties nor is 
necessary to resolve this case. 
  
and convincing.”  See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 42 (2009). 
Second, the removable noncitizen must establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he is eligible for some form of discretionary relief from removal—in 
Johnson’s case, asylum.  Under the statute governing removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(4)(A), the noncitizen has the burden of establishing that he “satisfies the 
applicable eligibility requirements” for discretionary relief and “merits a favorable 
exercise of discretion.”  “If the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for 
mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply, the alien shall have the burden 
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply.”  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.8(d).  The statutory and regulatory language clearly places the burden of proof on 
the noncitizen. 
The Supreme Court appears to endorse this two-step approach.  In Moncrieffe, the 
Court noted that a noncitizen convicted of any marijuana distribution offense, even a 
misdemeanor, would still be removable as a controlled substance offender under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1692.  But the noncitizen who is not an 
aggravated felon may seek discretionary relief from removal, such as asylum, provided 
he satisfies the other eligibility criteria.  Id.  Accordingly, the Court noted the 
government’s failure to establish that a noncitizen was convicted of an aggravated felony 
meant only that the noncitizen was not barred from discretionary relief, not that the 
noncitizen had established his eligibility for discretionary relief.  Id. 
B. 
Johnson is in the position of the noncitizen contemplated in Moncrieffe.  Johnson 
  
is removable for his controlled substance conviction, but he is not an aggravated felon 
barred from discretionary relief from removal.  Accordingly, Johnson may seek asylum, a 
form of discretionary relief, provided he establishes that he meets the eligibility criteria.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (noting a noncitizen applying for relief from removal has 
the burden of establishing eligibility for that relief and that he merits a favorable exercise 
of discretion).  If the evidence indicates one or more grounds for mandatory denial of his 
application for discretionary relief may apply, Johnson must show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that such grounds do not apply.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).   
The government has produced evidence of Johnson’s drug conviction.  In a typical 
case, therefore, Johnson would be required to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he was not convicted of a particularly serious crime in order to be eligible for 
asylum.  Cf. Syblis, 763 F.3d at 357.  But here the government has failed to preserve this 
issue for appeal. 
When appealing to the BIA, “[t]he party taking the appeal must identify the 
reasons for the appeal in the Notice of Appeal . . . or in any attachments thereto, in order 
to avoid summary dismissal . . . .”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(b); see also Hoxha v. Holder, 559 
F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 2009).  The government appealed two issues to the BIA:  (1) that 
Johnson was convicted of an aggravated felony and barred from receiving asylum, and 
(2) that Johnson did not meet his burden of proving he was not convicted of an 
aggravated felony for purposes of demonstrating his eligibility for asylum.  The BIA 
never reached the second issue.  Accordingly, the government appears to argue we should 
remand to the BIA for determination of whether Johnson met his burden of showing he 
  
was not convicted of a particularly serious crime. 
But the government’s appeal to the BIA did not focus on whether Johnson was 
convicted of a particularly serious crime, but rather on whether he was convicted of an 
aggravated felony.  The government’s argument to the BIA was that a particularly serious 
crime is synonymous with an aggravated felony.  See A.R. 84 (contending in the 
Statement of Basis of Appeal that Johnson was convicted of an aggravated felony and “is 
thus considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime”); Id. at 24 
(renewing this argument in its brief to the BIA and noting that “[h]aving been convicted 
of a particularly serious crime, the respondent is ineligible to receive asylum”).8 
Now that it is clear that Johnson was not convicted of an aggravated felony, the 
government appears to advance a different argument—that Johnson’s state drug 
conviction, even if not an aggravated felony, could nonetheless be a particularly serious 
crime.  But the government, as appellant, never properly raised this argument before the 
BIA, so the issue is waived.  See Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 
249 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We generally refuse to consider issues that the parties have not 
raised below.”); Frank v. Colt Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 1990) (“We hold 
that the defendant has waived this argument by its failure to present it in the proceedings 
prior to this appeal.”). 
Although the government referred to Johnson’s failure to establish he was not 
convicted of a particularly serious crime in its brief to the BIA, it did so in a section 
                                              
8 That argument is consistent with the asylum statute, which provides that “an alien who 
has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall be considered to have been convicted of 
a particularly serious crime.”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). 
  
focusing on whether Johnson had established he was not convicted of an aggravated 
felony.  Such a passing reference is insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.  See, e.g., 
Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 202–03 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding an 
issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief and “for those purposes a 
passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court” 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  Moreover, because the government 
waived the issue before the BIA, it cannot resurrect it in this appeal.  See, e.g., id. at 203 
(“We have consistently rejected such attempts to litigate on remand issues that were not 
raised in a party’s prior appeal and that were not explicitly or implicitly remanded for 
further proceedings.”). 
Our conclusion that the government waived this issue is bolstered by gaps in the 
government’s appellate brief in these proceedings.  “[A]bsent extraordinary 
circumstances, briefs must contain statements of all issues presented for appeal, together 
with supporting arguments and citations.”  Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 
1042, 1065 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5), (8) & (b) (requiring 
appellee’s brief to include a statement of the issues presented for review and appellee’s 
“contentions and the reasons for them”); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 28.2 (2008) (noting appellee’s 
brief must comply with Fed. R. App. P. 28(b)).  The government’s brief focuses on the 
supposed impact of Moncrieffe on the BIA’s decision and requests remand on that basis.  
It makes only passing reference—without any development of the argument—to the 
BIA’s failure to consider whether Johnson met his burden of proving his conviction was 
not for a particularly serious crime.  See Simmons, 947 F.2d at 1066 (“[A] passing 
  
reference to an issue in a brief will not suffice to bring that issue before this court on 
appeal.”).  Nor does the government address the complex issues inherent in the question 
it belatedly and briefly presents—whether a particularly serious crime differs from an 
aggravated felony and whether Johnson’s conviction could be the former but not the 
latter.  See Frank, 910 F.2d at 100 (“Particularly where important and complex issues of 
law are presented, a far more detailed exposition of argument is required to preserve an 
issue.”). 
Accordingly, on the procedural facts presented here, we conclude the government 
has waived the issue of whether Johnson met his burden of proving he was not convicted 
of a particularly serious crime rendering him ineligible for asylum. 
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s 
decision, and remand to the BIA with instructions to reinstate the IJ’s decision granting 
Johnson asylum. To the extent that the BIA has not yet completed the identity, law 
enforcement, and security investigations or examinations required by 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(d)(6) for the granting of Johnson’s asylum, it may first complete such  identity, 
law enforcement, and security investigations or examinations.  
